What should concern the public is that law enforcement wants to further streamline its ability to go ahold of ISPs' customer data. The reporting is meager, but at the bare minimum they want a "closed system" that will let them quickly dispatch legal requests to ISPs and are also making noises about data retention mandates going as long as five years for all customers. The data retention mandates are less likely to happen because they will be expensive to impose in terms of the new infrastructure ISPs would have to build out, and the new costs that would have to be passed along to users in a rough economy. For the moment, they're just a specter hanging over Internet privacy.
The problem with the "closed, secure system" for dispatching law enforcement requests is that it will neither be closed, nor secure. It will go over the public Internet for funding reasons, and the police will think it is law enforcement-only, just like the Greek government thought its ministers' cell phones were private. It will also be trusted, which means that less scrutiny will be placed on what records are sent over it since they will automatically have an assumption of having a valid origin by virtue of being on this network. And of course, there are no guarantees that the government machines will be kept up to date which opens up the possibility of a scenario like Russian organized crime or a foreign intelligence service grabbing one machine, turning it into a zombie and then making requests for information on targets.
Considering the fact that Chinese hackers specifically targeted GMail accounts connected to foreign journalists and Chinese dissidents, it should be obvious that such a system would give them the potential to make fake requests for information on servers in the US. Faxing or mailing a warrant may be slower, but it is easier to verify than a message which is signed with a particular computer's SSL certificate and that is just a web service call that comes from a computer that is listed as a trusted source.


